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During the more than thirty years of reform and opening up, the non-state-owned 
economy in China has developed gradually and deeply under the guide and support of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government. With great 
economic achievements the non-state-owned economy made, the non-state-owned 
enterprises in China began to come on the political stage to have certain rights of 
speech in politics. As the non-state-owned enterprisers’ awareness and interests of 
politics participation increase continuously, the phenomenon is more and more 
prevalent in the non-state-owned enterprises that there are at least one of top managers 
who was or is a member of People's Congress (PC), a member of Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a member of Congress of the CPC, an 
officer of central or local government, a member of Standing Committee of the PC or 
the CPPCC, a member of People’s Procuratorate or People’s Court or a member of 
Committee of the CPC. Usually, the relationship between firms and the government is 
called political connections and these corresponding firms are defined as politically 
connected firms by scholars. 
Political connections stand for the relationship between the non-state-owned 
enterprises and the government. In the standpoint of the non-state-owned enterprises, 
they view political connections as valuable resource and hope to get financing, fiscal 
subsidies, tax preference, market admittance, and so on through this valuable resource. 
From the government’s perspective, the government itself should perform a series of 
functions, such as stimulating employment, maintaining social stability, providing 
public goods and service, and so on. With the development of the non-state-owned 
economy, the government probably interferes the non-state-owned enterprises through 
political connections with policy burden, that is, a burden imposed on the 
non-state-owned enterprises which should be undertaken by the government. 
Therefore, as an objective existence in the non-state-owned enterprises, political 
connections should have the both effects of “Guanxi” and “government interference”. 
On one hand, politically connected firms can get the preferential treatments through 














likely to be interfered by the government. In short, political connections are a 
double-edged sword for the politically connected non-state-owned enterprises. As for 
the burden-imposed enterprises, according to the theory of Justin Yifu Lin etc., the 
government is responsible for the burden and has to assist these enterprises by means 
of fiscal subsidies, tax preference, and additional investment, and so on, which softens 
the budget constraint of the enterprises. Hence, not only the “Guanxi” effect of 
political connections but also the policy burden caused by the “government 
interference” effect can let firms get more government assistance. No matter which 
one functions, they both distort the resource allocation and influence the operation 
efficiency and incentive mechanism of the enterprises, which causes the inefficiency 
of resource allocation. 
For China as a developing great country where there are about 1.3 billion 
population and near 0.8 billion labor force of the right age of which the supply grows 
quickly, employment is always an important problem related to people’s wellbeing. 
Employment is the focus of people’s wellbeing, so employment stimulation that is the 
foundation of social harmony and stability is one of the most important 
responsibilities of the government. With regard to employment contribution, the 
non-state-owned enterprises have become the main channel for increasing 
employment. Up to the end of 2008, the employment gross the non-state-owned 
enterprises admit amounts to 89.6% of the social gross and 73.3% of the urban gross. 
In light of the fact, the employment burden is regarded as the measurement of the 
policy burden enterprises bear in this dissertation. Meanwhile, the dissertation takes 
the fiscal subsidies as a proxy for government assistance to enterprises. Based on the 
above analysis, this dissertation empirically examines how political connections affect 
firms and the results of influence on firms using a sample of the private listed firms 
over the period 2004 to 2008. The empirical results show that ceteris paribus, the 
employment scale of politically connected firms is significantly greater than that of 
their non-connected peers, that is, politically connected firms bear more employment 
burden. It is also showed that the more employment burden firms bear, the more fiscal 
subsidies firms get, which supports the policy burden theory of Justin Yifu Lin etc., 
and that political connections increase the softness of budget constraint, namely, 














the same level of employment burden. Finally, the subsidies for the politically 
connected firms are significantly less efficient in improving corporate performance 
than those for non-connected firms, which suggests the low efficiency of government 
subsidies allocation. 
During the process of China’s transition to a market economy, the relationship 
between the government and enterprises is always one of the most important problems 
in economic system reform. The research in this dissertation provides empirical 
evidence for the cause and result of soft budget constraint (SBC) in non-state-owned 
enterprises and proposes some policy suggestions concerning hardening the budget 
constraint, standardizing the behavior of the government and enhancing the capital 
allocation efficiency. It is prevalent that the government’s behavior influences 
enterprises in transition economy of China. As the non-state-owned economy 
develops increasingly, the research on the relationship between the government and 
enterprises is of profound significance for realizing economic transition, improving 
socialist market economy system, and pushing the establishment of harmonious 
society. 
The dissertation includes five chapters and proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research background and research issues, research train 
of thought, and research contributions of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature regarding political connections and soft budget 
constraint. 
Chapter 3 discusses the institutional background of the non-state-owned 
enterprises in China, develops the hypotheses, and introduces research design, which 
comprises research models, research variables, sample, etc. 
Chapter 4 reports and analyzes the descriptive statistics and the empirical results. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation, including research conclusions, policy 
enlightenment, research limitations, and further research orientations. 
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